Maryland Accident Attorney Blog

Our law firm recently handled a serious dog attack on a young child in Pennsylvania. Each jurisdiction we encounter throughout the mid-atlantic region has different variances on the owner of a dog that causes personal injury. Pennsylvania law is slightly different than Maryland.

The Pennsylvania Code contains the regulations pertaining to dogs. Dog Laws are codified in Title 3, Chapter 8, of the Pennsylvania Code. The portion of the dog laws pertaining to dangerous dogs is codified in 3 P.S. § 459-501-A through § 459-507-A.
Under Pennsylvania Dog Law, the owner/keeper of any dog is required at all times to keep the dog either :
1. Confined within the premises of the owner
2. Firmly secured by means of a collar and chain or other device so that it cannot stray beyond the premises on which it is secured; or
3. Under the reasonable control of some person
Pennsylvania Dog Law is the standard for determining whether a person has complied with the duty to exercise ordinary care. Unexcused violations constitute negligence per se. However, a violation of the Dog Law does not establish the necessary causation for a finding of liability. Liability does not attach unless the violation is a substantial factor is bringing about the injuries sustained. Villaume v. Kaufman, 379 Pa. Super. 561, 550 A.2d 793 (1988), aff’g Miller v. Hurst, 302 Pa. Super. 235, 448 A.2d 614 (1982).

Continue reading "Liability for Dog Bites under Pennsylvania Law" »

An article in the Baltimore Sun is reporting that one person was killed and three other people injured in a collision on wednsday night. The accident which occurred at the intersection of Old Court Road and Scotts Level Road involved a Jeep Cherokee and a Nissan Maxima. According to the article, the Baltimore County Police Department believes that the Jeep ran a red light striking the Nissan Maxima killing its driver and injuring its passenger. Police are still investigating.

WBAL is reporting in an online article that the worker killed Tuesday at the Dundalk Marine Terminal has been identified as 46 year old James Mills Gillus of Dundalk. Mr. Gillus was tragically killed when he was attempting to climb back into his vehicle after he noticed it was rolling backward and was struck by the vehicle. The vehicle he was operating is used to haul dumpsters around the marine terminal. State and Federal Workplace officials are investigating this accident. Mr. Gillus' family will be entitled to Workers' Compensation Death Benefits because he was killed during the course and scope of his employment. Additionally, under certain situations, they may be able to recover in a wrongful death action. An experienced Maryland Accident Attorney will be able to explain the family's rights to them.

Baltimore personal injury attorney, Craig Zissel of the firm Silverman Thompson Slutkin & White won a contested auto accident case in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County last Tuesday. Mr. Zissel's client was injured when the vehicle he was riding in was struck from behind while stopped at a stop light. GEICO denied liability for the accident claiming there was no way our client could have been injured due to the minor nature of the accident. Additionally, they pointed out the many prior accidents our client had been involved in. After deliberating for an hour, the Montgomery County jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff for the full amount of his medicals plus an award for non-economic damages to compensate him for his pain and suffering. Prior to trial, GEICO had offered no money to settle the case. This verdict represents a great result for Montgomery County, which is historically a defense-oriented, conservative jurisdiction.
At trial, Mr. Zissel focused the jury's attention on the evidence supporting his client's claims including the testimony, property damage photos and medical bills.

A Tour Bus travelling back from the Mohegan Sun Casino in Uncasville, Conn., to Chinatown, New York City crashed on I95 near the exit for the Huntington Parkway. News reports have confirmed at least 13 dead with many others injured, some critically. A spokesman for the New york State Police indicated that he expected the death toll to rise as several of the critically injured appeared to be in grave condition.

At least one report to 911 claimed that the bus was cut off by a tracker trailer that then left the scene. Police are interviewing witnesses and reviewing video to try to determine the accuracy of that report and if true, to locate the truck and its driver. The investigation should be helped by the fact that the driver of the bus has apparently survived the accident although he was injured. Police expect to interview him soon and expect the interview to be very helpful in determining the cause of the accident.

Continue reading "Tour Bus Crash on I95 in Bronx Borough of New York Killing Scores" »

Often in negligence matters against a corporation, the corporation does not have adequate insurance coverage to pay for the injured person's medical expenses and damages. In these instances when the corporation does not have assets, a diligent plaintiff's lawyer will go after the principal(s) of the corporation. This is known in legal terms as "Piercing the Corporate Veil".

“Maryland law is crystalline ‘that the corporate entity will be disregarded only when necessary to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity.’”
• The mere fact that all or almost all of the corporate stock is owned by one individual or a few individuals will not afford sufficient grounds for disregarding corporateness

If substantial ownership of the stock of a corporation in a single individual is combined with other factors which support disregarding the corporation on grounds of fundamental equity, a court may pierce the corporate veil. Factors weighed in an analysis to determine whether a corporation is the ‘alter ego’ or instrumentality of the individual stockholder are:
•Whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized
•Corporation’s failure to observe corporate formalities
•Non-payment of dividends
• Corporation’s insolvency
• Dominant stockholder’s siphoning of corporate funds
• Nonfunctioning of officers or directors
• Absence of corporate records
• Corporation’s status as a façade for the stockholders’ operations

Continue reading "Piercing the Corporate Veil " »

Although we are based in Maryland, our attorneys are often retained to handle wrongful death cases all over the United States. Below is a detailed discussion on the status of the wrongful death law in Massachusetts:

Questions Presented: (1) Who can bring, and benefit from, a wrongful death action under Massachusetts law? (2) What damages can be recovered for wrongful death? (3) Is there a cap on non-economic damages?

Discussion:

(1) Who can bring, and benefit from, a wrongful death action under Massachusetts law?

The entire statutory scheme for wrongful death recovery in Massachusetts is contained in G.L. c. 229. The basic principles for liability for wrongful death are set forth in G.L. c. 229, § 2, which provides:

A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person , or (2) by willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a person under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had no resulted, or (3) operates a common carrier of passengers and by his negligence causes the death of a passenger, or (4) operates a common carrier of passengers and by his willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a passenger under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted, or (5) is responsible for a breach of warranty . . . which results in injury to a person that causes death, shall be liable [for] damages. . . .

G.L. c. 229, § 2. Thus, the statute allows recovery for death resulting from negligence, breach of warranty, or reckless or intentional conduct.

The proper party to bring a wrongful death suit under G.L. c. 229, § 2 is the administrator or executor of the decedent’s estate. G.L. c. 229, § 2. The personal representative brings the action to enforce the rights of the estate and the statutory beneficiaries. The beneficiaries may not sue in their own names for any damages resulting from wrongful death. See Stockdale v. Bird & Son, Inc., 399 Mass. 249 (1987). A wrongful death action may be brought against any person or corporation who causes the death of a person. G.L. c. 229, § 2.

Continue reading "Overview of Massachusetts Wrongful Death Action " »

In Maryland, to establish a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that a false representation was made, (2) that its falsity was either known or that the representation was made with such reckless disregard to the truth as to be equivalent to actual knowledge of falsity, (3) that the representation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff had the right to, and did, reasonably rely on the representation, and would not have acted had the misrepresentation not been made, and (5) that the plaintiff suffered damage directly resulting from the misrepresentation. See Swinson v. Lords Landing Village Condo., 360 Md. 462, 476, 758 A.2d 1008, 1016 (2000) (citing Gittings v. Von Dorn, 136 Md. 10, 15-16, 109 A. 553, 553-54 (1920); Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 333, 439 A.2d 534, 537 (1982)).

In determining the amount of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation in Maryland, the Court of Appeals adopted the “flexibility theory” in Hinkle v. Rockville Motor Co., 262 Md. 502, 519, 278 A.2d 42, 47 (1971). In doing so the court stated, “[it] has never taken a rigid stand in adopting one theory of damages to the exclusion of all others but has rather employed a flexible approach.” This approach uses four rules as a guide for the proper measure of damages in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, which include:
(1) If the defrauded party is content with the recovery of only the amount that he actually lost, his damages will be measured under that rule;
(2) if the fraudulent representation also amounted to a warranty, recovery may be had for loss of the bargain because a fraud accompanied by a broken promise should cost the wrongdoer as much as the latter alone;
(3) where the circumstances disclosed by the proof are so vague as to cast virtually no light upon the value of the property had it conformed to the representations, the court will award damages equal only to the loss sustained; and
(4) where . . . the damages under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule are proved with sufficient certainty, that rule will be employed.”
Hinkle, 262 Md. at 511-12, 278 A.2d 42.

Additionally, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages in an action for fraud where “‘conduct of an extraordinary nature characterized by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of others’ is evident.” Thomassen Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Goldbaum, 45 Md. App. 297, 305, 413 A.2d 218, 223 (1980) (quoting Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 532, 366 A.2d 7(1976)). Maryland Courts have also held that punitive damages may be awarded in arbitration where appropriate, unless the arbitration agreement precludes such an award. Regina Const. Corp. v. Envirmech Contracting Corp., 80 Md. App. 662, 674, 565 A.2d 693, 699 (1989). Generally, Arbitrators are accorded a fair amount of discretion in fashioning remedies and sanctions, which includes punitive damages. Id.

Lawyers who practice personal injury and accident law in Maryland and across the United States are often surprised to learn that the United States has a right to recover from third parties the reasonable value of medical care and pay that has been furnished or will be furnished in the future to accident victims. See Army Regulation 27-20

42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53

In any case where the United States is authorized or required to pay for hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment under circumstances creating tort liability on a third person, the United States has an independent right to recover from the third person, or his insurer, the reasonable value of care and treatment furnished. The United States has a right to be subrogated to any claim that the injured person has against a third person to the extent of the reasonable care and treatment furnished. The United States may also require that the injured party assign his claim or cause of action against the third person to the extent of that right or claim.

If state law provides an alternative system of compensation or reimbursement for expenses of hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care or treatment under a policy of insurance, contract, medical, or hospital service agreement, or similar agreement, the United States is a third party beneficiary. The United States shall be subrogated to any right or claim the injured person has under the policy, contract, agreement, or arrangement to the extent of the reasonable value of care and treatment.

Continue reading "Recovery of Expenses by the Department of the Army in Personal Injury Cases" »

Over the weekend, 20-year-old Johns Hopkins University student Nathan Krasnopoler was critically injured while riding his bicycle. According to the Baltimore Sun, Krasnopoler was riding in a designated bike lane on West University Parkway and W. 39Th Street when he was hit by a vehicle turning right. Krasnopoler is in a comma and the Baltimore City police have issued no charges or citations.

These facts are disturbingly similar to the John Yates wrongful death case I litigated last year. In that matter, Mr. Yates was riding on the far right when he was struck by a truck which left the scene. The police blamed Mr. Yates, but we were able to overturn that finding. The Yates case brought legislative change and a focus on cyclist rights in Baltimore City. This change included new designated bike lanes. Unfortunately, the Baltimore City Police Department is still demonstrating an apparent bias against cyclists by failing to even issue a citation in an instance of clear negligence.

Often times Maryland lawyers who represent injured victims are faced with the real world problem of collecting on an otherwise valid claim. This arises in situations where the plaintiff/ victim is injured by a person who does not have any assets or insurance. When the defendant causes the injury while working, the experienced plaintiff's attorney will immediately look to recover (or collect) from the employer or his insurance policy. This is known as the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.

Respondeat Superior comes from the idea that where one of two innocent persons must suffer for the wrong of a third, it should be the one who enabled the third to do the wrong. In order to hold the employer liable for the injuries to a third person through the negligence of the employee the Plaintiff must show (1) that the employer had control or right of control over the employee; (2) that the action was within the scope of the employee’s employment; (3) the action was in furtherance of the employer’s business. It might also be necessary to show that the employer knew, or should have known of the need to control the employee.

The general test for determining whether an act is with in the scope of employment was set forth in Hopkins C. Co. v. Read Drug & C. Co., 124 Md. 210, 214, 92 A. 478, 479-80 (1914). “The simple test is whether they were acts within the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may be fairly said to have been authorized by him. By “authorized” is not meant authority expressly conferred, but whether the act was such as was incident to the performance of the duties entrusted to him by the master, even though in opposition to his express and positive orders.” (quoting from Wood on Master and Servant § 279 (1877)). Accord, e.g., Wood v. Abel, 268 Md. 214, 227, 300 A.2d 655, 671-672 (1973); Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 350, 283 A.2d 392, 397 (1971); LePore v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 Md. 591, 595, 207 A.2d 451, 453 (1965); Lewis v. Accelerated Express, 219 Md. 252, 255, 148 A.2d 783, 785 (1959); E.Coast Lines v. M. & C. C. of Balto., 190 Md. 256, 285, 58 A.2d 290, 303-04 (1948).

Continue reading "Respondeat Superior/Scope of Employment in Maryland Injury Cases" »

To sustain an award of punitive damages in tort cases in the District of Columbia, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed a tortious act, and by clear and convincing evidence that the act was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent. Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 938 (D.C.1995). The Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 16.01[1], provides that the jury “may award punitive damages only if the plaintiff has proved with clear and convincing evidence:

(1) that the defendant acted with evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or with intent to injure, or in willful disregard for the rights of the plaintiff; and

(2) that the defendant's conduct itself was outrageous, grossly fraudulent, or reckless toward the safety of the plaintiff.”

Croley v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 695 (D.C.2000) (quoting Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 16-1 (1998 ed.)); see also United Mine Workers of Am., Int'l v. Moore, 717 A.2d 332, 341 (D.C.1998).

Continue reading "The law of punitive damages in the District of Columbia " »