Maryland Accident Attorney Blog

Often times Maryland lawyers who represent injured victims are faced with the real world problem of collecting on an otherwise valid claim. This arises in situations where the plaintiff/ victim is injured by a person who does not have any assets or insurance. When the defendant causes the injury while working, the experienced plaintiff's attorney will immediately look to recover (or collect) from the employer or his insurance policy. This is known as the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.

Respondeat Superior comes from the idea that where one of two innocent persons must suffer for the wrong of a third, it should be the one who enabled the third to do the wrong. In order to hold the employer liable for the injuries to a third person through the negligence of the employee the Plaintiff must show (1) that the employer had control or right of control over the employee; (2) that the action was within the scope of the employee’s employment; (3) the action was in furtherance of the employer’s business. It might also be necessary to show that the employer knew, or should have known of the need to control the employee.

The general test for determining whether an act is with in the scope of employment was set forth in Hopkins C. Co. v. Read Drug & C. Co., 124 Md. 210, 214, 92 A. 478, 479-80 (1914). “The simple test is whether they were acts within the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may be fairly said to have been authorized by him. By “authorized” is not meant authority expressly conferred, but whether the act was such as was incident to the performance of the duties entrusted to him by the master, even though in opposition to his express and positive orders.” (quoting from Wood on Master and Servant § 279 (1877)). Accord, e.g., Wood v. Abel, 268 Md. 214, 227, 300 A.2d 655, 671-672 (1973); Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 350, 283 A.2d 392, 397 (1971); LePore v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 Md. 591, 595, 207 A.2d 451, 453 (1965); Lewis v. Accelerated Express, 219 Md. 252, 255, 148 A.2d 783, 785 (1959); E.Coast Lines v. M. & C. C. of Balto., 190 Md. 256, 285, 58 A.2d 290, 303-04 (1948).

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To sustain an award of punitive damages in tort cases in the District of Columbia, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed a tortious act, and by clear and convincing evidence that the act was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent. Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 938 (D.C.1995). The Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 16.01[1], provides that the jury “may award punitive damages only if the plaintiff has proved with clear and convincing evidence:

(1) that the defendant acted with evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or with intent to injure, or in willful disregard for the rights of the plaintiff; and

(2) that the defendant's conduct itself was outrageous, grossly fraudulent, or reckless toward the safety of the plaintiff.”

Croley v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 695 (D.C.2000) (quoting Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 16-1 (1998 ed.)); see also United Mine Workers of Am., Int'l v. Moore, 717 A.2d 332, 341 (D.C.1998).

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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is very difficult to establish under Maryland personal injury law.

In order to prove a prima facie case of IIED in Maryland, the Plaintiff must show:

1. That the conduct was intentional or reckless;
2. The conduct is extreme and outrageous;
3. There is a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress;
4. The emotional distress is severe.

To meet the fourth element, the emotional distress must be “severely disabling,” such that “no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Being “upset” and “embarrassed” is not sufficient to show severe emotional distress. Evidence that the Plaintiff could continue with his normal life activities or that he did not seek professional treatment can show that the distress is not “severe.”

In Green v. Shoemaker, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that a plaintiff cannot recover for emotional distress unless a “physical injury” results from the tort. Later, the court expanded a “physical injury” to include injuries “manifested by an external condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state.” The physical injury can be proven through evidence of an “external condition or by symptoms of a pathological or physiological state.” Also, it can be proven through evidence that indicates a “mental state.” However, medical testimony is not required in order to show mental distress.

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Many savvy corporations and other entities in Maryland are slyly slipping in arbitration clauses in agreements between parties. Many times these arbitration clauses force victims of personal injury to forgo their right to a jury trial and and undergo binding arbitration. Many times consumers do not even realize what they have agreed to because the arbitration clause is buried in the fine print of a document or contract.

History of Arbitration in Maryland:

In 1973, the Maryland Legislature adopted the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (hereinafter, “MUAA”). See MD. CODE ANN. CRTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201, et seq. (West 2010). Arbitration is the process whereby parties voluntarily agree to substitute a private tribunal (e.g. the arbitrators) for the public tribunal (e.g. the courts) otherwise available to them. Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103, 468 A.2d 91, 95 (1983). Parties may agree to arbitrate disputes pursuant to a contract between them, commonly known as an Arbitration Agreement. Id.

Matters which fall within the scope of an Arbitration Clause are subject to the procedures for arbitration set out in the agreement between the parties and the MUAA. “Where there is a broad arbitration clause, calling for the arbitration of any and all disputes arising out of the contract, all issues are arbitrable unless expressly and specifically excluded by the agreement.” Id. at 104. When the language of the agreement is ambiguous or unclear as to whether a matter falls within the scope of the Arbitration Clause, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the initial determination of whether a matter is arbitrable or not, should be left to the arbitrator and not the courts. See id. at 105 (“Question of substantive arbitrability initially should be left to the decision of the arbitrator, not the courts.”).

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